STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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TOWARDS A PERMANENT STABILITY FORCE

BY

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19980605 050

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Towards a Permanent Stability Force

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Towards a Permanent Stability Force

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 30 April 1998 PAGES: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

America's commitment of warfighting units of the Army to Humanitarian Assistance Operations is eroding capabilities in the areas of readiness, manning, funding and making the transition to a Force XXI design. Accordingly, this paper recommends the Army undertake a major study to examine the feasibility of establishing a permanent stability force to relieve pressure on maneuver units. The paper examines the impact of Humanitarian Assistance Operations using Somalia and Haiti as the primary vehicles for analysis. Additionally, the paper analyzes the Canadian Department of National Defence's response as they faced a similar dilemma in the early 1990s. Finally, it weighs the potential advantages and disadvantages of creating a permanent stability force and defines the major parameters that should be included in an Army study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

TOWARDS A PERMANENT STABILITY FORCE

INTRODUCTION.

The New York Times -- November 19, 200X

> WASHINGTON -- The President announced today that in response to the unstable conditions in the Philippines -- created by a failing economy coupled with the aftermath of the tidal wave that slammed into Luzon last month -- he has directed the deployment of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Manila as part of a multinational effort lead by the Asian Regional Forum. In keeping with his policy to use the military for peacetime global engagement, the mission of the Division will be to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the famine stricken and riotous population . . .

Unlikely scenario? Not in the volatile world rising from the dust of the post-Cold War. In the future, US involvement in similar situations will be driven by policies that define America's strategic interests more broadly than ever, to include not only a desire to foster democracy, but to secure "peace", human rights and ultimately an idealistic desire to alleviate human suffering. Paradoxically, the US Army's participation in these operations is increasing while at the same time it's size and budget are decreasing. The Army's leadership, at the Secretary level, has recognized this dichotomy as a serious readiness problem for the Army, undermining its fundamental purpose: to fight and win the nation's wars.[1] To preserve the Army's warfighting readiness, this paper recommends that the Army undertake a major study to consider the feasibility of creating a permanent "stability force" for operations to alleviate human suffering.

Since the end of the Cold War, US military participation in Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAO) is increasing. Borne not of a need to protect a US National Interest, but, in a broader sense, an idealistic desire to ease human suffering, involvement of US armed forces in HAO is virtually inevitable given the current foreign policy strategy of global engagement. The May 1997, National Security Strategy states, "By exerting our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous -- by deterring aggression, fostering the resolution of conflicts, opening foreign markets, strengthening democracies, and tackling global problems."[2] Civilian decision-makers are likely to continue to turn to the US military to create solutions for international crises or dilemmas that other instruments of national power have proved unable to solve. Simply put, because no other governmental agency is comparably manned, equipped, led or funded, the US military must remain prepared for these missions. This concept is fully embedded in the National Military Strategy. It is further reflected in the Army's "Shape, Prepare, Respond" strategy - which holds that the use of the military to quell the instability caused by a natural or man-made disaster, while it is just beginning, may prevent the need to fight a war later.

"The Army's challenge in this environment is to balance readiness, modernization, end strength, and quality of life while continuing to execute missions across the spectrum of military

operations."[3] Yet, recent indicators point to an Army out of balance. HAO commitments are eroding the ability of the Army to accomplish it's *raison d'etre* - warfighting. It is time for the Army to examine every option, to include creation of a permanent stability force, to ensure the Army remains prepared to fight and win our Nation's wars.

COUNTING THE COSTS

On a typical day in recent months, about 55,000 US military personnel were engaged in more than a dozen operations around the globe, few of which ever even made the evening news.[4] Smaller than at any time prior to World War II, the Army is nevertheless being called upon to conduct an increasing number of missions in non-traditional, non-combat roles. In the 40 years between 1950 and 1989 the Army only conducted 10 notable deployments; in the seven years since 1990 it conducted 25 (see appendix A). This number represents a 1429 percent increase in Army missions on an annual basis.[5] Yet, over the past seven years, the active duty end strength has plunged from 780,000 to 480,000, while at the same time the Army's budget has declined 39 percent in constant dollars.[6]

For more than forty years after World War II, the size of the Cold War military enabled the Army to more easily absorb the impact of unplanned contingencies. The Cold War provided a ready rationale for large defense budgets and standing forces. As a

result, the warfighting core was not deeply threatened by deviations from planned operations. Today, unplanned contingencies have a far greater impact on the combat readiness of the Army's ten active divisions. Typically, three divisions are not readily available for global commitment -- the 2d Infantry Division is committed to the Korean peninsula, the 4th Infantry Division is in the midst of transitioning to a Force XXI organization, and one division is committed in Bosnia. The Army must, therefore, make every effort to protect the warfighting readiness of the seven divisions truly capable of deploying to worldwide commitments.

But are Army troops losing their combat skills while performing the non-combat HAO roles they have been given in the majority of the operations undertaken since 1989? Soldiers seem to think so. In a 1997 "leadership assessment," 36 percent of the officers surveyed said their units do not know how to fight while nearly 50 percent expressed concern about the Army's growing "hollow."[7] More sobering assessments surfaced in an Army-wide survey conducted primarily to gauge the extent of sexual harassment problems. 15,000 soldiers in 220 companies were extensively questioned about a range of matters from sexual harassment to combat readiness. The survey showed that more than 60 percent of America's soldiers do not have enough confidence in the skills of their fellow soldiers to trust them with their lives in combat. Less than half believe their officers would

lead well in war and barely 50 percent have confidence in their company's ability to use their weapons or other equipment well.[8] Much of this erosion of confidence is attributed to the increasing number of non-combat, HAO missions in which these units have participated.

A number of factors, to include Post-Cold War personnel cutbacks, budget freezes, aging weapons and equipment, and an increased tempo of missions, have all combined to create this lack of preparedness.[9] Admittedly, the Army has little ability to influence most of these factors -- with the exception of changing it's organization by creating a permanent stability force to meet the challenges posed by HAO. Maintenance of a business as usual approach will only promulgate problems in the areas of training, funding, manning and retention. Additionally, transition from an industrial age Army to an information age Army has the potential to exacerbate readiness shortcomings if action is not taken to reverse current trends.

Training - Combat arms units, particularly at battalion level and above, suffer the greatest degradation in combat readiness as the result of participation in HAO. More specifically, the impact is most acute in maneuver units -- infantry, armor and aviation -- the integrators and synchronizers of combat power. The importance of effective synchronization of US combat power is distinctly recorded historically. Operations like the amphibious invasions of Normandy and Okinawa during

World War II, Operation Just Cause in Panama, and most recently Operation Desert Storm in Iraq demonstrate the outstanding results of successful synchronization. Just as distinctly, the failure to synchronize combat power effectively provides the Army stark reminders - numerous battles at Army Combat Training Centers and Task Force Ranger in Somalia are examples. Accordingly, synchronization is the essence of maneuver warfare doctrine, enabling a force to overmatch an enemy by concentrating the synergistic effects of joint and combined arms at decisive points on the battlefield.

Synchronization is not easy to achieve under ideal, non-resource constrained circumstances. Most maneuver battalions and brigades (even those not recently involved in HAO) exhibit synchronization shortcomings at combat training centers. Accordingly, protection of maneuver units from training distracters preserves the Army's core warfighting competency -- the ability to synchronize the effects of combat power. The non-combat roles prevalent over the last decade cause concern with regard to the Army's ability to execute maneuver warfare -- "We are raising a generation of young leaders who are not learning to run large organizations," says retired Marine Corps General John Sheehan (former Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Command). "They won't know how to command their troops even if they get them all in a war."[10]

On the other hand, some argue that one of the most appealing aspects of peacetime engagement is the potential training benefit to our own military forces.[11] For instance, support units perform similar tasks whether participating in HAO or Major Theater War (MTW) and, as a result, the impact on readiness is not as significant. But for maneuver units, the tasks required to execute HAO have little in common with the tasks required to synchronize combat power in a MTW. A comparison of some of the tasks required to execute a HAO and a combat operation provide useful insight into this dilemma. Training Circular (TC) 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package, June 1997, provides lesson plans for units preparing to execute Operations Other Than War -- to include HAO. Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) 7-10-Mission Training Plan (MTP), Infantry Company Collective Tasks, outlines an infantry companies' required warfighting tasks. The lack of similarity between the requirements for these operations is readily apparent:

Training and Evaluation Outline Tasks (TC 7-98-1)	***Infantry Company Collective Tasks (ARTEP 7-10-MTP)***
Interdict Smuggling Operations	Perform Reconnaissance
Disarm Belligerents	Assault
Defend a Convoy	Break Out From Encirclement
Negotiate a Belligerent Force Checkpoint	Move Tactically
Plan a Media Visit	Ambush
Negotiate	Overwatch/Support by Fire
React to Sniper	React to Contact
Establish a Checkpoint	Employ Fire Support
Deliver Supplies or Humanitarian	Perform Hasty River/Gap

Aid	Crossing
React to Civil Disturbance	Assault Built-Up Area
Restore Law and Order	Infiltrate/Exfiltrate
Prepare Traffic Control Plan	Perform Raid

Table 1: Task Comparison
(includes only a representative sample of tasks from each manual)

Prolonged operations (those long enough to require rotating units) are even more problematic. Since HAO operations tasks are not similar to warfighting tasks, pre-deployment training on HAO tasks is required for maneuver units. After participation in HAO, post-deployment time is required to retrain and refit to a combat ready status. Although not a HAO *per* se, the Multi-National Force and Observers mission in the Sinai provides useful insight into the nature of the cycle of rotating units in prolonged operations. Table 2 illustrates this cycle, which is just as applicable to a prolonged HAO with rotating units.

Pre-deployment Training (5 months)	Deploy	Deployment (6 months)	Leave	Combined Arms Training (3 months)

Table 2 - Infantry Battalion Deployment Training Cycle[12]
(16 months total)

Importantly, Table 2 also illustrates that for every unit actually deployed, a unit of like size is preparing and another is recovering. Roughly one division of ground forces at a time

has been deployed in peace operations and lower-intensity operations over the last four years in destinations that have included Somalia, Zaire, Haiti, and Bosnia. Maintaining such a rate in a commodious fashion that gives troops adequate time to be at home base and to train requires commitment of at least three divisions (one in each of the various phases of the cycle) as a rotation base.[13]

In a study conducted after the United Nations mission in Somalia, the following estimates provide insight into the time it took company size US units who participated to recover to a full combat ready status:

* *three months for light combat arms*
* *four months for heavy combat arms and CS units*
* *five months for CSS units*

These estimates reflect a peacetime business-as-usual approach during recovery operations. The longer time for CSS units reflects their historically lower priority for resources and training areas.[14]

The size of the unit deployed obviously factors into the recovery equation. Common sense dictates that it would take a platoon less time to recover from a deployment than a division. General Griffith, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, stated, "the 1st Armored Division would need at least 90 to 100 days of

training alone after withdrawal from Bosnia before it could be ready for deployment to a combat operation."[15]

Funding - Ever since America has embraced its policy of global engagement, Presidents have ordered unplanned deployments of our armed forces for diverse security and humanitarian reasons. Unfortunately, unplanned contingency operations coupled with legal and fiscal restrictions limiting the Department of Defense's (DOD) flexibility to manage the costs result in eroded combat readiness.

Over the years Congress has approved supplemental appropriations to help DOD cover the costs of unplanned contingency operations. In fiscal year 1994 Congress passed two emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $1.5 billion.[16] Sadly, the second of these appropriations was not granted until the last day of the fiscal year. As a result, commanders in the field canceled fourth quarter training (due to lack of funding) further contributing to readiness problems. Moreover, the appropriation only partially covered DOD expenses. Due to extremely limited flexibility (legally) with regard to shifting monies within the DOD budget, the operations and maintenance (O&M) account provides the only real monetary source available for contingencies.

In fiscal year 1995 DOD contingency costs were estimated at $2.6 billion or roughly one percent of the $253 billion budget. At first glance, one percent seems like a small problem for DOD.

However, severe legal restrictions limit DODs flexibility with their budget. Without going into the specifics, the only real flexibility DOD has with regard to diverting monies is with the O&M budget -- $45 billion in FY 1995. Of that $45 billion, almost 50 percent is virtually untouchable since it is committed to civilian pay, health care and retirement programs. That leaves $27 billion of truly flexible funds. Therefore, diverting $2.6 billion in FY 95 equaled an amount equal to almost 10 percent of DOD flexible funds. Degrading the DOD O&M budget by 10 percent has a significant impact with regard to funding training, exercises, and maintenance of equipment (particularly if the 10 percent is deferred until the fourth quarter of a FY).[17]

In November 1995 DOD estimated that the Bosnia operation would carry a $2 billion price tag. When President Clinton reversed his previous commitment to a one-year contingency and extended the end date of the operation to June 1998, the estimated price tag more than tripled to $6.5 billion (as of February 1997).[18]

Capitol Hill is not likely to become more responsive with regard to reimbursement for unplanned contingencies. Therefore, the Army must devise a plan to limit the impact of unfunded contingencies on maneuver units. A permanent stability force, with Congressionally mandated funding authority, provides one possibility. A permanent stability force for HAO under the

combatant command of a Commander-in-Chief (CINC), (for instance, CINC Special Operations Command since he already has separate Title 10 authority) would allow Congress to commit funds to a "HAO contingency fund" not constrained by the limitations of the current two year budget cycle. In this manner, funds not used this year could be "rolled over" into the next FY account, thereby eliminating the current "use or lose" budget mentality prevalent in US Government. Additionally, this approach would shield the Army's warfighting units from the readiness degradation caused by paying for unplanned contingencies. Furthermore, reimbursing a single unit for HAO costs, vice reimbursing the almost 1500 units that participated in Somalia, would significantly simplify accounting procedures.

Manning - Another warfighting readiness problem arises when manning units for HAO. Generally, in order to ensure operations are resourced for success, the Army requires units to deploy at close to 100 percent of their authorized strength. Most units require fillers from other units to meet that requirement. In the case of Somalia, the personnel data indicated that personnel deployed from almost 1,500 different units (company and battalion size), only 20 of which deployed 100 or more persons. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) identified fewer than 250 units in deployment records.[19] In other words, fillers were provided to the 250 deploying units from 1250 other units. In a more specific Somalia case, the TPFDD identified only ten

Military Police (MP) companies. The personnel deployment data showed MPs deployed from 62 different units. The statistics are similar for the deployment to Haiti.[20] This alarming trend indicates that, in many cases, non-deploying units have lost so many personnel that they could not train collectively on warfighting tasks even if they were provided the requisite time, funds and training resources.

The busy pace and "do more with less" attitude appears to be driving out more experienced soldiers than ever. Retention rates from FY 1994 - FY 1996 indicate the Army was only able to retain approximately 82 percent of its' stated goals.[21] Reenlistment rates for highly deployed units -- like the 10th Mountain Division -- have been very high to date, primarily because soldiers enjoy putting their training to practice and enjoy being part of an effective team. But some observers, pointing to illuminating evidence of many battalion commanders and talented subordinates leaving for civilian life, fear the Army is pushing its luck.[22] The memory of the prospect of repeated deployments to Vietnam driving NCOs out of the Army, damage that took 15 years to repair, still lingers in the minds of many senior Army personnel.[23]

When coupled with retention and recruiting shortfalls, the manning problem is even more menacing. For example, in FY 1997 the Army only recruited 70 percent of the infantrymen it needed. Current Army statistics show that 125 infantry squads --

equivalent to about 5 infantry battalions -- are unmanned, keeping units from training at the appropriate combat strength.[24] This problem is so widespread that at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1997, the 25th Infantry Division hosted a conference for Army light infantry units to discuss tactics, techniques and procedures for fighting under strength.

Creation of a permanent stability force could alleviate some of the Army's manning pressure in at least two ways. First, creation of a properly organized stability force (manned at a level where authorizations equal requirements) would preclude the need to go to hundreds of other units for fillers in order to send a full strength unit on a deployment. Second, soldiers who volunteer for duty in a stability force would know exactly what to expect -- extended deployments away from home in non combat roles. This knowledge, coupled with limitations in tour length in the stability force, would provide a more palatable alternative to unexpected deployments by maneuver units already suffering from a Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) that it too high.

An Army in Transition - Transitioning from an industrial age Army to an information age Army will be no small feat. New organizations, equipment, doctrine, and tactics are currently being developed. This new "wave" in the cycle of warfare portends some serious reengineering on the part of the Army. Currently, the Army is shielding the 4th Infantry Division from participation in HAO contingencies to enable them to participate

in Army Warfighting Experiments and complete the transition to a Force XXI design. The Army's goal of facilitating the transition of a Corps to a Force XXI design by 2001 could be seriously jeopardized if the Army does not devise a plan to shield these warfighting units from HAO. A permanent stability force is one way to provide such a shield for maneuver units attempting to make this critical transition.

POINT OF DEPARTURE

Assuming that organization of a permanent stability force for HAO could shield Army warfighting units and thereby improve combat readiness; if the Army were to undertake a feasibility study for such a force, is there any historical precedent from which to begin?

The Canadian Model. Canadians consider themselves the architects of modern peacekeeping and stability forces. Over the past 40 years Canada has taken an active role in promoting peace and stability around the globe. Canadian commitment to HAO is underpinned by its traditional goals -- the deterrence and reversal of aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the relief of civilian populations.[25] This commitment to the relief of human suffering has caused a dilemma similar to the one now faced in the US with regard to over commitment of the armed forces with the resulting degradation in combat readiness.

Early in the 1990s, Canada discovered the price of over commitment of the armed forces to peace and stability operations.

Downsized to just three infantry brigade groups, the Canadians realized, "the infantry component of all three brigades is constantly in turmoil, preparing for, conducting or recovering from an overseas tour. Under such an arrangement, infantry unit skills and the more complex brigade-level skills for combat will quickly atrophy and disappear."[26]

Non combat HAO not only eroded basic warfighting skills, but had a predictable impact on personnel as well. In the beginning of this decade, Canadian units were experiencing an increase in operational tempo similar to that of US forces today -- resulting in back to back peacekeeping deployments. Quite simply the tempo began driving people out of the armed forces.

The leadership of the Canadian armed forces was apparently so concerned in late 1992 about the impending personnel crisis, that General A.G. John de Chastain, Chief of the Defense Staff, floated the idea of establishing a special Canadian peacekeeping force that would consist of volunteers who signed up for shorter terms of duty, would receive basic combat training and then only be sent on peacekeeping missions.[27]

The armed forces at large opposed the idea. In effect, they felt it would create two categories of personnel: peacekeepers on one hand and "warfighters" on the other. Additionally, the plan undermined the cherished notion of Canadian armed forces that regular soldiers, trained and equipped for combat, make the best

peacekeepers.[28] In any event, the idea was abandoned within a week after its introduction.

Even more than the US military, Canadian armed forces have experienced significant reductions in force structure in the aftermath of the cold war. According to Dr. Joseph Jockel, Professor of Canadian Studies at Saint Lawrence University in New York, and a field agent for the Canadian Strategic and International Studies Institute, Canadian armed forces (all services) are scheduled to draw down from a cold war strength of over 100,000 to an end strength of 40,000. Accordingly, Canada must rely on cooperative security arrangements with the US in the event of a major threat to Canadian sovereignty. Indeed, Canadian forces have, over the years, had to divest themselves of several specific capabilities -- to include aircraft carriers, cruisers, medium lift helicopters, medium range patrol aircraft, as well as separate fleets of fighter aircraft for air defence and ground attack roles.[29] This reduction in force coupled with the reliance on the US for security revived General de Chastain's notion with a new twist -- why maintain a combat force at all? Could Canada meet peace and stability objectives by fielding only a constabulary force?[30]

In order to resolve the debate and re-examine the roles and missions for the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence ordered an in depth study of the problem. The

results of this study were published in the White Paper 1994. Some of the more pertinent findings were:

- Canada would maintain a combat capable force because, "by opting for a constabulary force - that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat - we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future."[31]

- Maintenance of core combat capabilities formed a basis for the generation of larger forces should they ever be needed.

- Given the size of Canadian Armed Forces, it would be "misguided to invest in very specific forces and capabilities, whether at the higher end of the scale or at the lower end. In short, maintenance of multi-purpose forces represents a pragmatic, sensible approach to defence at a time of fiscal constraint."[32]

- Canada would continue to strongly support the United Nations (UN) and remain prepared to contribute forces to a wide range of UN multilateral operations.

- Canada could not, and need not, participate in every multilateral operation given the finite nature of Canadian resources.

In sum, Canada downsized it's military to the point that it could not afford to specialize. Additionally, in order

to retain any credibility among peers in cooperative security arrangements, it had to maintain a combat capability.

Understanding the need to protect the warfighting capability of their Army units in particular, the Canadian Department of National Defence endorsed a proposal presented to the UN General Assembly in late 1995 by their Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet. The proposal was craftily designed to allow Canadian support for UN peacekeeping operations while at the same time limiting the impact on Canadian armed forces. The center piece of the proposal involved creating a "vanguard force," composed of national units available on standby, that could be deployed within three to five weeks of a decision to begin a UN operation - much faster than the several months that, in the past, typically have elapsed between a decision and the deployment of peacekeepers.[33]

The main elements of the proposal that would alleviate the pressure on Canadian armed forces were:

- the use of improved standby arrangements to create a multinational "vanguard force" of up to 5,000 personnel, well-trained, and capable of rapid deployment to respond to an immediate crisis or, in the case of a longer-term need, to establish a UN presence prior to the arrival of a more robust peacekeeping force;

- the creation of a permanent operational-level headquarters, composed of 30-50 personnel, to command the

vanguard force and conduct training and contingency planning for possible missions when not in the field;

The Canadian government offered to contribute personnel to the operational headquarters and to earmark standby units for the vanguard force itself.[34] The White Paper 1994 further states that Canada will contribute up to three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support) with one of the infantry battalion groups serving as a UN stand-by (vanguard) force.[35] This strategy will enable Canada to shield two of its three brigade groups from HAO, allowing them to focus on combat readiness.

Although Canada did not opt to create a permanent peace and stability force, the Canadian study provides useful insight for the US. First, although much smaller than at the beginning of the decade, the US Army has probably not yet downsized to the point that politicians will limit the commitments to HAO (as the Canadian government has done). Second, lack of plan to shield maneuver units from HAO will result in significantly degraded combat readiness. Third, cooperative participation in HAO under the auspices of the UN provides an opportunity to lessen US commitment. And, finally, the US Army should at least, study creation of a permanent stability force in earnest.

WEIGHING THE BENEFIT

Does creation of a permanent stability force offer enough potential to warrant a detailed study? Although a solution set to any problem offers inherent advantages and disadvantages, the nature of the Army's readiness problems created by participation in HAO more than justify a detailed study of the issue. Prior to examining the potential advantages and disadvantages, it would be useful to explore a possible organization for a permanent stability force to provide a baseline for discussion (see Appendix B).

ADVANTAGES

training - permanent stability forces would shield the remainder of the army from the distracters created by HAO, thereby enabling maneuver units to focus on maintaining critical warfighting skills. At the same time, stability forces could focus their training efforts on the types of tasks required in stability and support operations.

manning - a volunteer stability force (similar to rangers or Special Forces) would ensure soldiers know the expectations, i.e. long deployments away from home station in non-combat roles. In effect, they would get "what they signed up for." Additionally, if not enough volunteers were available, Department of the Army could limit the length of the tour of those soldiers required to serve, giving them a "light at the end of the tunnel."

funding - tracking and reimbursing HAO costs for a single force would be imminently more efficient. Calculating the costs for the personnel who deployed from 1500 different units to Somalia (as described earlier) represents a tremendous investment of man-hours. Additionally, it would be far easier for the Army leadership to describe the impact of unfunded HAO if that impact could be clearly traced to a single unit.

transition to Force XXI and AAN - warfighting Army units would be shielded from the disruption caused by the execution of HAOs during the critical transition from an industrial age army to the information age army of the future. The ability to shield a Corps for a transition to a Force XXI design by 2001, is likely to be extremely difficult, as well as costly (in terms of readiness) to the rest of the Army's maneuver forces, without the creation of permanent stability forces.

no new Military Occupation Specialties (MOSs) - the force depicted in Appendix B envisions a stability force requiring creation of no new MOSs. By reorganizing existing Army units, a permanent stability force would be relatively easy to activate.

lessens the ad hoc nature of Command and Control for HAO - typically Army units deploying to HAO have been thrown together as an *ad hoc* unit (as described previously in the Somalia and Haiti examples). While Army doctrine makes provision for such

arrangements, deploying cohesive units who know one another and have trained together provides a more desirable alternative.

improved relations with the UN - a permanent stability force would allow the US to earmark standby forces for commitment to multilateral UN operations, complementing Canada's Vanguard proposal and improving overall relations with the UN. Additionally, the number of forces actually committed by the US could be potentially fewer. By the end of October 1995, in light of the Vanguard proposal, 47 countries had confirmed their willingness to enter into standby arrangements with the UN involving a total of 55,000 military and civilian personnel.[36]

DISADVANTAGES

Although not much is written with regard to permanent stability forces, the primary disadvantages to creation of a permanent stability force appear to revolve around three issues: relevancy, reorganization and force protection.

relevancy - some Army leaders see visible use of Army forces in peacetime as "force structure justification."[37] An Army not actively and visibly engaged runs the risk of being viewed as irrelevant in this era of fiscal constraint. Correspondingly, a permanent stability force could, if it received more visibility than maneuver forces, pave the way for further force reductions in Army maneuver units.

reorganization - since no new force structure is likely to be authorized, the Army would have to reorganize part of its 480,000 end strength to form a permanent stability force. All such undertakings are destined to meet with parochialism and resistance to change. Undoubtedly, the effort would be painful and require an extraordinary amount staff work. Additionally, the possibility exists for requiring units to move from one base to another in order to co-locate stability forces. Re-locating units is both complex and costly.

force protection - criticism of the Army is likely in the event of conflict resulting in stability force casualties. Doubtless, there would be criticism regardless of the force (as was the case with Task Force Ranger in Somalia, 1993). Nevertheless, a stability force, not designed for warfighting -- but engaged in a high casualty producing clash, would provide an opportune target for critics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army should undertake a detailed and in-depth feasibility study for the creation of a permanent stability force. Guidance to the group or organization charged to conduct the study should include but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- assume no new force structure.

- determine roles and missions (to include limitations) of a stability force designed for HAO.

- determine size, organization and equipment required for a permanent force.

- determine command and control requirements for the force to include a recommendation for it's apportionment under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (in other words, which Commander-in-Chief (CINC) would have combatant command (COCOM) of the stability force? Examine the possibility of placing the stability force under COCOM of the CINC US Special Operations Command to determine if the fact that he is a supporting CINC who already has Title 10 authority and "owns" Civil Affairs units provides any inherent advantages.

- include reserve components in the stability force.

- estimate costs of activating a stability force, to include: permanent changes of station, initial training, and equipping.

- develop the force within the constraints of existing Army Military Occupation Specialties.

- study the feasibility of an all-volunteer force and recommend tour lengths for the force.

- examine historical HAO costs and recommend a proposed annual budget for the stability force -- study the possibility of asking for separate Title 10 authority (similar to United States Special Operations Command) for the stability force. Investigate

the possibility of asking Congress to provide a HAO contingency fund (not tied to the two year budget cycle) that would "roll over" into the next year if unused.

- determine how the stability force could best be used in a Major Theater War -- force protection in rear areas? Security of critical nodes? Etc.

- determine the feasibility and/or potential savings of committing the stability force as part of a UN multilateral effort.

Conclusions

The ability of the Army to execute its primary mission of warfighting is at risk due to downsizing of both budget and personnel coupled with an over commitment to HAO. The potential advantages of creating a permanent stability force justify a detailed study of the subject. Even if no advantages were readily apparent, the Army can not afford to continue a business-as-usual approach -- it must explore every alternative to resolving the serious issues it now faces.

Word Count 6,171.

APPENDIX A

Deployments from 1950-1989	Deployments from 1990-current
Korea, 1950-1953	Just Cause, Panama - 1990
Vietnam 1965-1975	Desert Shield, Saudi Arabia 1990-1991
Watts - 1965	Sinai MFO 1982-?
Dominican Republic - 1966	Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia 1991
Detroit - 1967	Provide Comfort, Iraq 1991-?
Chicago - 1967	Sea Angel, Bangladesh - 1991
Sinai MFO 1982-?	Southern Watch, Iraq 1991-?
Lebanon - 1983	Restore Hope, Somalia - 1992
Just Cause, Panama - 1989-1990	Provide Promise, Croatia - 1992
	Hurricane Andrew, FL - 1992
	Hurricane Inike - 1992
	Macedonia - 1992
	L.A. Riots - 1993
	Midwest Floods - 1993
	UNOSOM II, Somalia - 1993
	Cuba Migrants - 1994
	Uphold Democracy, Haiti 1994-?
	Safe Haven, Panama - 1994
	Support Hope, Rwanda - 1994
	Western US Fires - 1994
	Vigilant Warrior, Kuwait - 1994
	Joint Endeavor - 1995
	Deliberate Force - 1995
	Vigilant Sentinel, Kuwait - 1995
	Bosnia - 1996

Table 3.: **Army Deployments from 1950-Current**[38]

APPENDIX B

A Possible Permanent Stability Force Organization

Over the past 10 years trends have developed highlighting what the services call low-density, high demand units, which are few in number but frequently deployed for contingency operations. In other words, the stress of conducting HAO is highest for very specific units. Maneuver units are then deployed to secure the smaller number of soldiers in low-density units. For the Army those units appear to be military police, engineers, logistics units, Special Forces and civil affairs units.[39] Civil affairs (CA) units are a special challenge since over 90% are in the reserve component. In a speech to the Army War College in late 1997, an Army General Officer (who is not named due to the College's non-attribution policy) with an in-depth knowledge of the subject, stated that 65% of all reserve CA units have already spent one rotation in Bosnia. Given the historical exigency for the capabilities these low-density, high demand units provide, they should be the foundation of a stability force.

Figure 1 depicts a stability force division of approximately 5000 personnel. While this size force would provide a significant contribution to a UN multilateral operation, it is purely arbitrary and should not be used in lieu of the results of a detailed study. Additionally, two more 5000 man divisions

could be created from the reserve component to give the US the capability to field a "Stability Corps."



Figure 1

Figure 1: Possible Division Organization

This organization is obviously not designed as a force capable of warfighting in the traditional sense, nor should it ever be placed in a situation where armed conflict with an organized and trained opponent is likely. Certainly, potential for hostilities exists during the conduct of most military operations, and this stability force is robust enough for self-protection and limited enforcement. More difficult operations, such as peace enforcement, should be left to maneuver units to ensure the Army does not negligently place soldiers into a situation for which they are not prepared.

ENDNOTES

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